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ABSTRACT 
 
Sixty-four years ago, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. W.J. Howey, 
crafting a definition for one form of security, known as an investment 
contract. The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey 
is flexible, consistent with the Congressional approach to defining the 
broader concept of what constitutes a security. This choice of adopting a 
flexible definition for investment contract is not without cost, and raises 
the specter of inconsistent interpretation and/or application by the lower 
courts that threatens to undermine the utility of the Howey test itself as a 
trigger for investor protection. The intentional breadth and adaptability of 
the definition of investment contract necessarily leads to complex and fact-
intensive judicial inquiries in the application thereof, and allows for 
inconsistent results between and among the various courts engaging in 
such inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants 
winding up with dissimilar outcomes.  
Examples of these disparate outcomes are present in a number of 
industries, including the viatical settlement industry. Viatical settlements 
are a form of “asset-backed securities” under which purchasers buy the 
right to receive death benefits under life insurance policies from 
policyholders. These days, the very words “asset-backed security” may 
cause the public to recoil in horror, thinking of the sub-prime mortgage 
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debacle and Bernard Madoff being led off in handcuffs while his 
devastated victims sobbed on the evening news. But not all asset-backed 
securities are problematic, and when undertaken legally and ethically, 
these interests can be solid investment vehicles, providing needed liquidity 
to the capital markets.  
As the financial markets continue to grow and innovate, new forms of 
asset-backed securities will likely be created, and the potential for inconsistent 
treatment of similarly-situated investors in these asset-backed securities 
arguably increases, prompting the question explored herein of whether the 
definition of investment contract in the Howey test is too flexible to further the 
underlying legislative intent of the federal securities laws to protect investors 
through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability. At present, investors 
and issuers have no certainty as to the absolute parameters of the test or how 
any given court will articulate or interpret the definition of investment 
contract. The test has been burdened by judicially-imposed nuances, as judges 
try to give meaning to the Supreme Court’s words, and as a consequence, has 
triggered uneven applications.  
This Article challenges the Howey test in light of today’s increasingly 
complicated and volatile securities markets, focusing on whether the 
underlying legislative goals of the federal securities laws are still met by 
the Howey test, as currently construed by the courts. The Article provides 
an overview of the legislative history and current status of the U.S. law on 
the definition of investment contracts, with a brief examination of the 
component parts of the Howey test, followed by a discussion of the current 
regulation of the purchase of insurance policies from insurance policy 
holders in viatical settlement transactions, as background for the analysis 
highlighting the shortcomings of the Howey test discussed therein. The 
Article examines the resale of interests in life insurance policies 
purchased in viatical settlements, focusing on the inconsistent 
characterization of viatical settlements by the federal courts, specifically 
in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp. and offers 
recommendations to further the underlying goals of the securities laws 
with respect to investor protection through disclosure and anti-fraud 
requirements in an effort to honor these goals without sacrificing 
consistency for the very investors these laws were enacted to protect. The 
Article ultimately concludes that the benefits of the flexibility of the Howey 
test outweigh the costs in terms of dissimilar results for similar 
investments and that the uneven applications of the Howey test by courts 
should be considered necessary collateral damage, acceptable in light of 
the significant protections still triggered by the Howey test.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Sixty-four years ago, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. W.J. Howey 
Co.,1 crafting a definition for one form of security, known as an 
investment contract. Discussion by judges and academics of the Supreme 
Court’s definition of investment contract, which has come to be known as 
the Howey test, has primarily focused on the individual components of the 
test,2 virtually ignoring the more fundamental underlying question 
explored in this Article, whether the Howey test itself furthers investor 
protection through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability, the 
intended purpose of the federal securities laws.3 The Howey test seeks to 
identify transactions in which investors are relying on others to manage 
the enterprise that will produce financial returns on their investments.4 The 
theory is that these investors need the disclosure that would come from 
registration under the federal securities laws more than investors who are 
themselves participating in the management of the enterprise.5  
Under the Howey test, any interest that “involves an investment of 
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts 
of others" is an investment contract,6 thereby included within the 
definition of “security” and subject to the rules and regulations of the 
                                                 
1 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
2 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 
307 (2000): 
[T]here have been no fewer than 792 cases decided and over 300 law 
review articles written in which either the ‘33 or ‘34 Act definition of a 
security has played a prominent role. There has been an ebb and flow in 
the rate of production of these cases and articles with a sharp, although 
perhaps temporary, decline in the period since 1993. 
 
Much, if not most, of the law review commentary dealing with the 
definition of a security takes inspiration from, and focuses on, 
relatively few decisions. For instance, a number of authors have chosen 
to critique one or more of the eleven Supreme Court cases that address 
the definitional question. Another popular, and sometimes coterminous, 
approach has assessed some single aspect of the meaning of security in 
the context of the most significant cases.  
Id. at 308-09. 
3 According to the Supreme Court, the statutory purpose of the securities laws is 
“compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’” 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)).  
4 Id. at 299. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 301. 
2011] THE HOWEY TEST TURNS 64 5    
       
federal securities laws.7 The term “security” is defined broadly8 in both the 
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (1934 Act).10 Both statutes provide a laundry list of examples and 
categories of securities, including “any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a ‘security,’”11 in an effort to include in the definition all of the 
many types of instruments Congress predicted would or should fall within 
the ordinary concept of what constitutes a security.12 Although there are 
                                                 
7 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The threshold issue triggering the application of the 
federal securities laws to any instrument is whether such instrument satisfies the statutory 
definition of “security.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10) (2006). The determination 
that an instrument constitutes a security has far-reaching implications for both issuer and 
holder. Issuers of securities have disclosure, anti-fraud and registration obligations 
(absent any available exemption from registration). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-g (2006). It is 
unlawful to engage in the offer or sale of a security without registration or an exemption 
listed in section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-e (2006). Holders 
of securities have related rights and remedies for any violations by the issuer, including 
the issuer’s defective registration or failure to register such securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77k-p. 
8 According to the Supreme Court, Congress painted with a broad brush in defining 
the scope of the market that it wished to regulate. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. It recognized 
the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of “countless 
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profits.” Id. So the Court concluded that Congress determined that the best 
way to achieve its goal of protecting investors was to define the term “security” in 
“sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many 
types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security.” United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)). “Congress therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the 
scope of the Securities Acts. Rather, it enacted a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad 
to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.” Reves v. 
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).  
9 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).  
10 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10).  
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10). 
12 According to one commentator: 
The term was included in the definitional section of the Federal 
Securities Act of 1933, § 15 U.S.C. 77b, as well as many state 
securities laws for a particular reason: the drafters of these statutes 
realized that, at one point in time, they could not predict all the various 
investment products the ingenuity of participants in the securities 
business could concoct. In effect then, the term investment contract can 
be analogized to an expansion joint as it provides flexibility and adds a 
universal quality to the definition of investment security. This is 
especially true in the federal domain, and in particular, the Securities 
Act of 1933, § 15 U.S.C. 77a, et seq. It was because the courts imposed 
an expansive construction of federal securities law that a definition 
evolved for the term investment contract. For, standing alone, the term 
would be meaningless. 
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minor differences between the two statutes’ definitions, these differences 
are not germane here for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the two statutory definitions are to be treated as the same.13 
Second, and more relevant here, while both statutes include within their 
respective definitions the term “investment contract,”14 neither statute 
defines that term.15   
Thus, when it comes to fleshing out what constitutes an investment 
contract, the Supreme Court’s admonishment that “[t]he starting point in 
every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself” is not 
very helpful.16 In the absence of any statutory definition, the concept of 
what constitutes an investment contract has been developed through 
extensive case law, which provides a starting point for statutory 
construction, and ultimately, statutory critique.17 These judicial decisions 
take into account, to varying degrees, the underlying legislative purposes 
of the federal securities laws18 to provide investor protection through 
mandatory disclosure of the information investors need to make informed 
                                                                                                                         
Willis H. Riccio, The Ubiquitous Investment Contract, 56 R.I. BAR J. 15, 15 (2007). 
13 The Supreme Court has consistently held that “[t]he definition of a security in 
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act ... is virtually identical [to the definition in the Securities Act 
of 1933] and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the 
same.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 847 n.12.  
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10). 
15 Id. 
16 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring).  
17 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Arguably, the groundwork 
for the Howey decision was laid in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. when the Court 
noted that varying canons of construction would lead to overly narrow results and that 
such canons should be subordinated to: 
[T]he doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in 
conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in light 
of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words 
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally 
expressed legislative policy.  
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). 
18 According to the Supreme Court: 
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate 
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of 
the Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of 
securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on 
which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud 
and to protect the interest of investors. Because securities transactions 
are economic in character Congress intended the application of these 
statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and 
not on the name appended thereto. 
Forman, 421 U.S. at 849.  
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investment decisions19 and, through anti-fraud liability, to put some teeth 
into the mandatory disclosure requirements by imposing significant 
penalties for violations thereof.20 As a result of the disclosure 
requirements and anti-fraud liability, investors and securities markets 
arguably will have the information needed to move capital to its optimal 
uses.  
These judicial decisions also reflect the desire for flexibility that is 
manifest in the legislative history of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.21 
Congress intentionally avoided a rigid statutory definition of security in an 
effort to give the courts flexibility in interpreting this important and far-
reaching concept.22 The definition of security thus encompasses stocks, 
options, debt instruments, and other financial interests typically considered 
to be securities.23 The definition has also been broadly interpreted to 
include instruments that might not at first appear to be securities, such as 
fractionalized interests in pools of home mortgage or auto loans, interests 
in earthworm farms and chinchilla ranches, and various forms of pyramid 
schemes, all of which have been classified as investment contracts under 
the Howey test and thus have been deemed securities.24 The Securities and 
                                                 
19 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding 
that the primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to “substitute a philosophy of 
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). Moreover, “[o]ne of [the 1934 
Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure 
by issuers of securities ….” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Thus, the 
design of the statute was to “protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information 
thought necessary to informed investment decisions.” SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 
U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 
38, 40 (1941)). “[T]he Court repeatedly has described the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the 
Act as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure ….’” Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (quoting Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186). 
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-p (2006) (prescribe the forms of liability, actions, and remedies 
against violators); see also Ralston, 346 U.S. at 124 n.10 (noting that the 1933 Act’s 
second primary objective is to prevent fraud in the sale of securities). 
21 See, e.g., SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 
2004), aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[f]irst and foremost, the federal 
securities laws were drafted and have consistently been interpreted from the perspective 
that flexibility in the law's applicability is paramount”). 
22 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting 
the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by 
whatever name they are called.”). To that end, the Court found that Congress enacted a 
broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any instrument that 
might be sold as an investment.” Id. 
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10). 
24 Timothy P. Davis, Should Viatical Settlements Be Considered “Securities” Under 
the 1933 Act?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 78 (1997) (noting that these interests have 
all been characterized as “investment contracts,” and thus securities) (citing Smith v. 
Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (earthworm farms); Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla 
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Exchange Commission (SEC), in an effort to further investor protection, 
has maintained with varying degrees of success that the concept of 
investment contract should and/or does include many financial schemes 
not specifically mentioned by the federal securities laws, thereby honoring 
the Supreme Court’s instruction that, “in searching for the meaning and 
scope of the word ‘security’… form should be disregarded for substance 
and the emphasis should be on economic reality.”25 
The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey is 
flexible, consistent with the congressional approach to defining the 
broader concept of what constitutes a security.26 The choice of adopting a 
flexible definition for investment contract is not without cost, however. 
The intentional breadth and adaptability of the definition of investment 
contract necessarily leads to complex and fact-intensive judicial inquiries 
in the application thereof, and allows for the possibility of inconsistent 
results between and among the various courts engaging in such inquiries, 
creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants winding up with 
dissimilar outcomes.27 Indeed, the specter of inconsistent interpretation 
and/or application by the lower courts arguably threatens to undermine the 
utility of the Howey test itself as a trigger for investor protection.  
Examples of these disparate outcomes are present in a number of 
industries, including the viatical settlement industry. Viatical settlements 
are a form of asset-backed security under which purchasers buy the right 
to receive death benefits under life insurance policies from 
policyholders.28 These days, the very words “asset-backed security” may 
cause the public to recoil in horror, thinking of the sub-prime mortgage 
debacle and Bernard Madoff being led off in handcuffs while his 
                                                                                                                         
Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchilla ranch); SEC v. Glenn W. 
Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973) (pyramid schemes)). 
25 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
26 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975). 
27 In one of the first Supreme Court cases to interpret the Howey test, the Court noted 
that, in defining the term “security,” Congress was not attempting to:  
[A]rticulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing “securities” 
from “non-securities”…. The task has fallen to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the 
Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of 
the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage 
of these statutes. 
Id. at 847-48.  
28 Davis, supra note 24, at 75. Viatical settlements occur when insureds sell the right 
to receive their life insurance policies to investors who typically pool multiple policies 
and sell fractionalized interests in the pool. Id. The circuits are split on whether such an 
interest constitutes a security. See infra Part III (discussing the two federal appellate 
decisions considering this issue). 
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devastated victims sobbed on the evening news. But not all asset-backed 
securities are problematic, and, when undertaken legally and ethically, 
these interests can be solid investment vehicles, providing needed liquidity 
to the capital markets. Asset-backed securities include a wide array of 
financial instruments that give investors a claim on the interest and 
principal payments generated by a pool of assets, like mortgage loans, car 
loans, or, in the case of viatical settlements, life insurance policies.29 As 
the financial markets continue to grow and innovate, new forms of asset-
backed securities will likely be created, and the potential for inconsistent 
treatment of similarly-situated investors in these asset-backed securities 
arguably increases, prompting the question explored herein of whether the 
definition of investment contract in Howey is too flexible to further the 
underlying legislative intent of the federal securities laws to protect 
investors through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability.30 At 
present, investors and issuers have no certainty as to the absolute 
parameters of the test or how any given court will articulate or interpret 
the definition of investment contract.31 The test has been burdened by 
judicially imposed nuances as judges try to give meaning to the Supreme 
Court’s words, triggering uneven applications. The issue at hand is 
whether these uneven applications are necessary collateral damage 
balanced by the protections offered by the Howey test or a signal that the 
test should be revised, reframed, or even retired as it approaches age sixty-
five.  
The Howey test is analogous to that house in your neighborhood onto 
which the owners build a myriad of new additions. The additions are in 
roughly the same style as the original house, but are clearly additions, and 
sometimes awkward additions at that. Some additions seem to have 
nothing to do with the original house, and may even look unstable. The 
consensus of neighbors with taste is that the house should be torn down 
                                                 
29 See O. Emre Ergungor, Securitization, ECON. COMMENT. (2003). 
30 The federal securities laws were enacted "to restore the confidence of the 
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities." S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 
(1933); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933). 
31 See Kyle M. Globerman, Casenote, The Elusive and Changing Definition of a 
Security: One Test Fits All, 51 FLA. L. REV. 271 (1999).  
Nevertheless, the lack of uniformity that results from this ad hoc 
method of review is problematic because investors cannot, with 
predictability, determine if the transactions they engage in are within 
the scope of the Security and Exchange Acts. In view of the varying 
tests available to the judiciary, the legislature can achieve the intended 
purpose of the Acts by rewriting the definition of a security to be any 
transaction that satisfies the elements of a slightly modified Howey test. 
Id. at 274-75. 
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and rebuilt from scratch. In the case of the Howey test, our congressional 
homeowner and, more importantly, the equally recalcitrant courts, refuse 
to do so, piling on more additions, potentially threatening not just the 
symmetry, but ultimately the integrity of the underlying structure.  
Despite the volume of scholarly and judicial writings on Howey, much 
of it critical,32 the Howey test is still good law and arguably has taken on a 
quasi-statutory aura.33 This Article challenges the Howey test in light of 
today’s increasingly complicated and volatile securities markets, focusing 
on whether the underlying legislative goals of the federal securities laws 
are still met by the Howey test, as currently construed by the courts. This 
necessitates an overview of the legislative history and current status of 
U.S. law on the definition of investment contracts, with a brief 
examination of the component parts of the Howey test. Part I of this 
Article will explore the statutory, case law, and academic discussion 
centered on the definition of investment contract under U.S. law, including 
a brief discussion of the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part II 
discusses the current regulation of the purchase of insurance policies from 
insurance policy holders in viatical settlement transactions as background 
for the analysis in Part III highlighting the shortcomings of the Howey test 
discussed therein.  
Part III provides a critique of the current approach to defining 
investment contracts and, using viatical settlements as a focal point, 
demonstrates a weakness in our securities laws that can and has resulted in 
otherwise identical investments triggering very different outcomes for 
injured investors. This analysis will support the conclusion that the courts, 
and by extension some state and federal lawmakers, have expressed a 
reluctance, both implicit and explicit, to pin down a specific definition of 
investment contract, leaving this task to any willing state court or 
legislature. The Article will further demonstrate that a cost of this 
reluctance is that similarly situated litigants are denied reliably consistent 
remedies—certainly with respect to the ultimate boundaries of such a 
definition. Part III also examines the resale of interests in life insurance 
policies purchased in viatical settlements, focusing on the inconsistent 
characterization of viatical settlements by the federal courts, specifically in 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.34 and the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp.35 
                                                 
32 See Gabaldon, supra note 2, at 308-09.  
33 Riccio, supra note 12, at 15; see, e.g., SEC v. Charles E. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 
(2004) (where the Court reverses a lower court ruling that conflicts with the Howey test). 
34 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
35 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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Part IV questions the characterization of viatical settlements under 
state statutory and case law, offering recommendations to further the 
underlying goals of the securities laws with respect to investor protection 
through disclosure and anti-fraud requirements in an effort to honor these 
goals without sacrificing consistency for the very investors these laws 
were enacted to protect. This Article ultimately concludes that the benefits 
of the flexibility of the Howey test outweigh the costs in terms of 
dissimilar results for similar investments and that the uneven applications 
of the Howey test by courts should be considered necessary collateral 
damage acceptable in light of the significant protections still triggered by 
the Howey test. 
 
I. DEFINING “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” 
 
Before the Supreme Court decided Howey, and before Congress 
enacted the 1933 Act, courts struggled to concretize a meaning for the 
term investment contract.36 The term had no standard meaning in any 
commercial context, yet appeared in many states’ blue sky laws predating 
the 1933 Act, always without a statutory definition.37 Conceptually, the 
lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress on both 
the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring 
within the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not 
otherwise constitute securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments 
that trigger a need for investor protection through mandatory, accurate 
disclosure. This flexibility also creates the opportunity for inconsistent or 
unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially triggering instability 
for the investing public. 
State and lower federal courts attempted to flesh out the definition of 
investment contract, seeking a definition, the interpretation of which 
would ideally cover any investment scheme that triggered an investor’s 
need for the protection of the securities laws.38 The Supreme Court, in 
                                                 
36 See Larry Soderquist, Reach of the Securities Act Regulation, 1490 PLI/CORP. 113, 
116 (2005). 
37 Id.  
38 According to the Supreme Court: 
Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon 
economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract 
or scheme for “the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way 
intended to secure income or profit from its employment.” This 
definition was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of 
situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common 
enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely 
through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than 
12        WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW       [Vol. 2:001 
  
crafting the original Howey test, tipped its hat to the judicial and 
legislative history surrounding the definition of investment contract.39 The 
Court noted that the term investment contract had been “broadly construed 
by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of 
protection.”40  
The state court definition of investment contract evolved over time, 
and served as the basic framework for the test the Supreme Court 
ultimately crafted in Howey.41 The Court noted that this definition had 
been uniformly applied by the state courts “to a variety of situations where 
individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the 
expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the 
promoter or of some one [sic] other than themselves.”42 The Court found 
the prior judicial interpretation of the term to be reasonable, both because 
Congress had used the same interpretation, and because the Court found 
the interpretation to be consistent with the statutory aims of “compelling 
full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept 
of a security.’”43 The Court went on to state the oft-quoted language that 
                                                                                                                         
themselves. 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & 
Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. According to one commentator, the federal courts looked to the state courts for 
guidance on defining investment contract: 
Initially, federal courts followed suit and looked to how states were 
defining and interpreting the term "investment contract" as per their 
Blue Sky laws. By 1941 the lower federal courts began expanding on 
the principles established by states and developing their own method 
for defining and analyzing the investment contract issue. While the 
form of the transaction was given careful consideration, courts were 
willing to "look through the form to discover the real nature of the 
transaction." In doing so, it was determined that "an 'investment 
contract' ... is one which contemplates the entrusting of money or other 
capital to another, with the expectation of deriving a profit or income 
therefrom, to be created through the efforts of others.” 
Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for Common 
Ground in the “Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 
(2008). 
43 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.  
By including an investment contract within the scope of § 2(1) of the 
Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of which had 
been crystallized by this prior judicial interpretation. It is therefore 
reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used by Congress, 
especially since such a definition is consistent with the statutory aims.  
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this interpretation of the term investment contract “embodies a flexible 
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the 
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the 
money of others on the promise of profits.”44 
Before Howey, the SEC brought various actions in support of its view 
that the concept of investment contract should be construed broadly to 
include a variety of financial schemes not specifically mentioned by the 
federal securities laws.45 In bringing the Howey facts to a trial court, the 
SEC contended that the activities of the W.J. Howey Company and its 
sister service corporation, Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. (Howey 
Service) constituted the sale of unregistered securities in violation of 
section 5(a) of the 1933 Act;46 it sought an injunction to prevent the 
companies from using the mails and the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce in the offer and sale of these interests.47 Each prospective 
investor was offered both a land sales contract from W.J. Howey 
Company and a service contract from Howey Service, and all were told 
that it was not feasible to invest in the grove without a service contract,48 
presumably because the investors would have no ability to tend to the trees 
themselves and needed to outsource this critical function. The investors 
took this to heart, and of the fifty-one parcels sold during the time period 
relevant to the litigation, forty-two purchasers entered into service 
agreements with Howey Service.49 The SEC claimed that, because the 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 298; see H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933). 
44 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
45 See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sales of oil-
producing land leases). 
46 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293 
(1946). The Fifth Circuit found: 
[T]he two companies under the same common control, with the same 
officers, facilities, and personnel, and substantially the same 
stockholders, were engaged in carrying on an investment business, to-
wit, the growth and cultivation of citrus trees and the marketing and 
sale of fruit therefrom; that by the device of deeds from the Howey 
Company to the groves, and cultivation and management contracts 
from the Service Company, they were in substance and effect selling 
investment contracts to customers in that, though the purchasers of 
groves paid their money in form as purchasers of specific tracts of land, 
they were in fact investors with the Howey Companies in a citrus 
growing and marketing enterprise, the profits from their purchases to be 
derived not from their own skill and efforts but from the skill and 
efforts of others.  
Id. 
47 Howey, 328 U.S. at 294. 
48 Id. at 295. 
49 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff’d, 151 F.2d 
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investment interests had to be accompanied by a service contract, the 
investors were purchasing securities.50 The trial court disagreed with the 
SEC and denied the relief requested.51 
The trial court’s reasoning provides insight into the then-current 
judicial thinking about the definition of security. The trial court focused on 
the established nature of the citrus industry in Florida,52 primarily to 
contrast earlier precedent, where the same trial court found the sale of land 
contracts in the “new untried and undeveloped industry”53 of tung oil to be 
the sale of investment contracts, and thus securities, because of the 
remedial nature of the 1933 Act.54 This idea, that offerings from 
established firms were not investment contracts but that somehow, 
otherwise substantially similar offerings from new or undeveloped 
industries were investment contracts, is not supportable under the 
legislative history of the 1933 Act, nor is it consistent with the judicial 
thinking underlying prior state cases.55 The SEC thus eventually brought 
the case to the Supreme Court, seeking judicial clarification of the 
definition of investment contract.56 
                                                                                                                         
714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 442. 
52 Id. (noting that the long established citrus industry “antedates the building of rail-
roads in the State and its progress has been such that it is the largest single farming 
activity in the State today”). 
53 Id. 
54 SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941). Discussing the application 
of the Securities Act, the trial court found: 
The Securities Act is remedial in nature, to be liberally construed. It 
affects, not ordinary land sale contracts, but ‘investment contracts‘ 
which evidence primarily a right to participate in the proceeds of an 
income-producing venture, membership in which is secured through 
entrusting an investor's capital to the management of others. In 
appraising contracts for the purpose of determining the applicability of 
the statute, courts readily look through the form to discover the real 
nature of the transaction. Labels affixed by the parties are of little 
moment. 
Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff’d, 151 
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Howey trial court relied on the 
fact that, during the time period relevant to the suit, all the purchasers had actually 
inspected the property. Id. This lays the groundwork nicely for the last prong of the 
Supreme Court’s Howey test, requiring that the profits of the investment contract “come 
solely from the efforts of others.” SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).  
Since the purchasers had all physically inspected the land before buying the land, they 
were involved enough in the process to arguably not need the protections of registration 
under the 1933 Act. 
55 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. 
56 Id. at 294. 
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The Supreme Court then articulated the original Howey test that, 
although refined over time by subsequent case law, is still the current test 
for classifying interests as investment contracts, and embodies what the 
Supreme Court considers the “essential attributes that run through all the 
Court’s decisions defining a security.”57 The Supreme Court articulated 
the Howey test as follows: “The test is whether the scheme involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely 
from the efforts of others.”58 The Howey test isolates transactions in which 
ownership is separated from control,59 which suggests the importance of 
mandatory disclosure and higher liability standards to ensure that investors 
allocate capital to its highest-valued uses.60 The test is entirely consistent 
with the investor protection goal of the federal securities laws. 
Returning to the house analogy discussed earlier, the four prongs of 
the test constitute the original house. Judicial interpretations, especially 
judicially-imposed additions and bright-line tests, constitute the remodels 
and extensions to the initial structure that some neighbors may think are 
appropriate while others worry about the structural integrity of the entire 
house. As a matter of common sense, there is a limit to how much 
additional weight any one structure can hold in total, with similar, smaller 
calculations necessary to determine how much weight any one particular 
part of the structure can withstand. So too with the Howey test: judicial 
additions to some of the components may be supportable on their own, but 
the cumulative effect may call into question the structural integrity of the 
entire test. 
Numerous litigants have explored the parameters of the Howey test, 
but litigation involving Howey does not tend to focus on the validity or 
correctness of the test itself; rather the cases focus on the specific meaning 
of one or more of the component parts.61 Courts typically break the test 
into four parts: a transaction constitutes an investment contract, and thus a 
security, triggering the application of the federal securities laws if (1) the 
purchaser invests money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the 
expectation of profits; (4) solely from the efforts of others.62 Other 
commentators have already dissected the components of the Howey test at 
length,63 and thus only a brief overview of the test is provided, in order to 
                                                 
57 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
58 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
59  Id. (the Howey test focuses on profits resulting “from the efforts of others”).  
60  See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text. 
61 Gary M. Brown, Reach of Securities Act Regulation, 1756 PLI/CORP. 177, 183 
(2009). 
62 Id. 
63 See generally Borsani, supra note 42; Brown, supra note 61. 
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offer context for the later challenge of the inconsistent outcomes for 
similarly-situated investors that flow from differing judicial interpretations 
and additions to the test.  
First prong: investment of money. The first prong of the Howey test 
requires that the purchaser of the investment contract invest money into 
the enterprise.64 This prong is rarely litigated, as proponents typically can 
establish an investment of something of value.65 The Supreme Court relied 
on State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.66 for the framework underlying this 
component of the test, building on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
definition in Gopher Tire that “[t]he placing of capital or laying out of 
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment 
is an ‘investment’ as that word is commonly used and understood.”67 The 
investment of money criterion is satisfied if one puts out consideration 
with the hope of some future return.68  
Second prong: commonality. The second prong of the Howey test 
requires that the investment of money be in a “common enterprise.”69 The 
Supreme Court did not explicitly define the term “common enterprise” in 
Howey, but the Court did implicitly define the term by holding that the 
investors in Howey had satisfied this prong.70 In the absence of guidance 
from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have taken up the issue and 
fleshed out the definition of a common enterprise.71 These lower court 
definitions focus on the extent to which the success of the investor’s 
interest rises and falls with others involved in the enterprise, including the 
other investors or the promoter, with three different judicial standards 
emerging to satisfy the requirement of a common enterprise.72 
Three circuits require a form of common enterprise known as 
horizontal commonality, which focuses on the connection between the 
individual investor and other investors in the enterprise.73 This form of 
                                                 
64 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Although the investment of money prong has not been at 
issue in any of the viatical settlements litigations at either the federal or state level and so 
is not central to the analysis herein, this brief mention is included for the sake of 
completeness. 
65 But see Shannon L. Thompson, Securities Regulation in a Virtual World, 16 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 89, 103 (2009) (discussing potentially problematic “virtual world 
currencies” and whether their value in “virtual world investments” can satisfy the first 
prong of the Howey test). 
66 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920); Brown, supra note 61, at 184. 
67 Gopher Tire, 177 N.W. at 938. 
68 Soderquist, supra note 36, at 119. 
69 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
70 Id. at 300. 
71 Borsani, supra note 42, at 7. 
72 Id. at 7,  n.40. 
73 Horizontal commonality has been adopted by the Third, Sixth and Seventh 
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commonality requires that investors share the risk of the enterprise, 
usually through a pooling of funds. When horizontal commonality is 
present, multiple investors have interrelated interests in a common scheme 
and their fortunes are interwoven; they pool resources, share profits and 
share losses on a pro rata basis.74 
Other circuits look for vertical commonality between the investor and 
the promoter of the scheme, which requires that the promoter and at least 
one investor share the risk.75 When vertical commonality is present, one 
single investor has a common interest with the manager of his investment 
so that the investor’s fortunes are inextricably interwoven with and 
dependent on the fortunes of the promoter/manager of the enterprise.76 
Vertical commonality has been further broken down into two subparts: 
strict vertical commonality and broad vertical commonality.77 Strict 
vertical commonality has its roots in a footnote from SEC v. Glenn W. 
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,78 in which the Ninth Circuit noted that “a 
common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are 
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those 
seeking the investment or of third parties.”79 Strict vertical commonality 
thus requires “the fortunes of the investor to be commingled with, and 
dependent upon the success of the promoter.”80 The Ninth Circuit, 
currently the only proponent of this form of common enterprise, looks for 
the fortunes of the investor to be commingled with and dependent on the 
success or failure of the promoter, requiring that the promoter have a 
financial stake in the investment at issue.81 
Broad vertical commonality has its roots in SEC v. Koscot 
Interplanetary, Inc.82 Like strict vertical commonality, this approach looks 
                                                                                                                         
Circuits. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 
(6th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 
96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977); Wasnowic v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. 
Pa. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973). 
74 Borsani, supra note 42, at 8. 
75 Brown, supra note 61, at 185. 
76 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973). 
77 The Fifth, Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted vertical commonality, with 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits adopting a broad vertical commonality approach and 
leaving the Ninth Circuit standing alone as a proponent of strict vertical commonality. 
See Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 
595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
78 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973). 
79 Id. at 482 n.7. 
80 Borsani, supra note 42, at 10. 
81 Id. 
82 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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to the connection between the fortunes of the investor and the fortunes of 
the promoter.83 Broad vertical commonality focuses on the efforts of the 
promoter, requiring that the investor be dependent on the promoter.84 The 
promoter need not benefit from the investment under this form of 
commonality.85  
These three approaches to finding a common enterprise illustrate the 
courts’ response to the flexibility of the Howey test, and provide an 
example of the judicial remodeling of the original structure of the test. 
While some investments satisfy both horizontal and vertical commonality, 
some may satisfy only one. Thus, which circuit ultimately reviews a 
particular investment and rules on whether it constitutes a security is 
critical, leading to the very real possibility of inconsistent results for 
similarly situated, injured investors. The Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Mordaunt v. Incomco,86 a case examining the classification of 
discretionary commodities futures contracts, with Justice White 
dissenting:  
 
The importance of this conflict is not limited to the classification of 
discretionary commodities futures contracts. In related areas the lower 
courts are similarly divided as to whether Howey requires vertical or 
horizontal commonality …. In light of the clear and significant split in 
the Circuits, I would grant certiorari.87  
 
Despite Justice White’s observations in Mordaunt, the Supreme Court 
has, to date, declined to take up the issue of what constitutes a common 
enterprise, to the disappointment of many.88  
                                                 
83 See id. at 478. 
84 See id. at 478-79. 
85 Borsani, supra note 42, at 10-11. 
86 469 U.S. 1115 (1985) (cert. denied). 
87 Id. at 1116-17 (White, J., dissenting). 
88 See Borsani, supra note 42. One commentator highlights the current state of the 
law: 
With essentially three competing theories on the proper method for 
analyzing the “common enterprise” it begs the question: what is the 
proper method to utilize? But more importantly, it implores the 
Supreme Court to take a stance on the issue so that there may be some 
uniformity amongst the lower courts. 
Id. at 14. He goes on to say: 
In a hazy, and often complex area full of many uncertainties within the 
various circuits, what is clear is that the Supreme Court needs to take 
the initiative and, at the very least, address the confusion. It has been 
over sixty years since the Supreme Court first laid out the test for an 
investment contract in SEC v. Howey, and since then every court has 
struggled with interpreting the “common enterprise” element. It is time 
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Third prong: expectation of profits. The third prong of the Howey test 
requires that the investment of money into this common enterprise be 
undertaken with the expectation of profits.89 The expected return on the 
investment must come from earnings of the enterprise, not merely 
additional contributions, and this return must be the principle motivation 
for the investment.90  
Fourth prong: solely from the efforts of others. The fourth prong of the 
original Howey test requires that the investment of money into this 
common enterprise be undertaken with the expectation of profits solely 
from the efforts of others.91 Lower courts have considered whether 
“solely” means “only” in their articulation of the Howey test, and some 
courts have eased the rigidity of the need to have the profits derived solely 
from the efforts of others by including profits that come “primarily,” 
“substantially,” or “predominantly” from the efforts of others.92 In the 
absence of this movement away from the strict construction of the word 
“solely,” investors would be excluded from the protection of the securities 
laws with respect to any arrangement that involved even the most minimal 
efforts from the investors themselves.93  
The Supreme Court itself softened its stance and seemingly endorsed a 
more relaxed standard for the derivation of the expectation of profits by 
omitting the word “solely” from its explication of the Howey test in United 
Housing Foundation v. Forman,94 noting that the “touchstone is the 
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable 
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial 
efforts of others.”95 There is a split in the circuits about whether to follow 
                                                                                                                         
for the current Justices to assume the role that Justice White wanted the 
Court to take back in 1985 and the role that was circumvented by the 
Court in SEC v. Edwards. There needs to be commonality among the 
courts for what will constitute an investment of money in a common 
enterprise. Otherwise, courts will be faced with the coming attractions 
of even more complex analysis with the same answer: we don't know. 
Id. at 17. 
89 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
90 Many courts combine the third and fourth components, and thus refer to the test as 
a three part test. See, e.g., Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 
SEC v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“We distilled Howey’s definition into a 
three-part test ….”). This combination makes sense, as the full idea is that the investor 
has an expectation of profit and that expectation must come, to a large measure, from the 
efforts of someone other than the investor. 
91 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
92 See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1974). 
93 Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003). 
94 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
95 Id. at 852. 
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this more flexible interpretation implicitly adopted by the Supreme 
Court.96 
Regardless of whether a court chooses to adopt the more flexible 
interpretation, that court, and later, commentators, examine how much 
effort the promoter put into the project and how much effort the investor 
put in to see if the expectation of profits prong is met. Once a court has 
determined how much effort the promoter has put into the project, the next 
step is to evaluate such efforts to see “whether the efforts made by those 
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential 
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”97 
Courts availing themselves of the flexibility in Howey’s “expectation 
of profits solely from the efforts of another” prong, either by adding in 
additional facets to the four prongs, or bright-line tests, have created 
inconsistent outcomes; this is also the case with resale of pools of 
fractionalized interests in life insurance policies purchased by viatical 
settlement companies.98 
 
II. THE VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
 
Congress intended the securities laws to have a broad reach,99 and the 
courts have complied, honoring Congress’ broad definition of what 
constitutes a security. The Supreme Court made clear that: 
 
[T]he reach of the [1933] Act does not stop with the obvious and 
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they 
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they 
were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which 
established their character in commerce as ‘investment contracts.’100 
                                                 
96 According to the Supreme Court: 
This test speaks in terms of “profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others.” Although the issue is not presented in this case, we note that 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “the word 
‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the 
definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed 
realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which 
involve in substance, if not form, securities.” We express no view, 
however, as to the holding of this case. 
Forman, 421 U.S. at 851 n.16 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)). 
97 Glenn Turner, 474 F.2d at 482. 
98 See infra Part II. 
99 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933) (referencing “the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security”). 
100 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). 
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Viatical settlements, arguably one such novel, uncommon, or irregular 
device, are a form of asset-backed security under which purchasers, 
known as viatical settlement companies, buy the right to receive death 
benefits under life insurance policies from policyholders, known as 
viators, at some discounted rate that takes into account, among other 
factors, the expected life span of the viator.101 Viatical settlements are 
admittedly less novel, uncommon, and irregular today than they were in 
the late 1980s when they first came into the public eye.102  
The typical viatical settlement has two phases: a purchase phase, 
where some person or entity purchases the life insurance policy from the 
terminally-ill policyholder, and a resale phase, where this new owner 
either (1) holds the policy until it matures, (2) sells the policy to someone 
else, or (3) pools the policy with other policies and sells fractionalized 
interests therein.103  
The pooling of income-generating assets and the subsequent sale of 
fractionalized interests therein is virtually mainstream these days, and in 
most cases, such resales should satisfy the Howey test. Further, the typical 
                                                 
101 For a discussion of the history of the viatical settlement industry, see Miriam R. 
Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy Implications of Viatical 
Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013 (1998). 
The amount paid to the viator for a policy is an estimation of its present 
value. This present value is calculated in light of factors such as the 
projected life expectancy of the policyholder, the prevailing economic 
climate (particularly current interest rates), the face value of the policy, 
and the cost of at least two years of future premiums, which, under the 
viatical settlement agreement, become the responsibility of the 
purchaser, absent a disability waiver of premiums. Also relevant to the 
purchase price are such factors as the financial strength of the issuing 
life insurance company, the viatical settlement company's cost of 
funding the policy acquisition, and any miscellaneous expenses.  
 Id. at 1020. 
102 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 
F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The viatical settlement industry emerged during the late 
1980s as a result of the AIDS crisis and has grown rapidly.”). 
103 See Fiona M. Jones, Comment, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The Regulatory 
Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 478-81 
(1999). The first option does not trigger securities law issues, and thus will not be 
explored here. The SEC implicitly acknowledged this, as noted by the trial court in Life 
Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 19. “The Commission readily agrees that a straight viatical 
settlement is not a security.” Id. Presumably a “straight viatical settlement” means one in 
which the purchaser of the policy holds the policy till maturity and does not resell it. The 
D.C. Circuit court further supports this idea when it said “presumably a firm might also 
buy insurance policies for its own account or act as an agent, matching a single investor 
with a terminally ill insured, without running afoul of the securities laws.” Life Partners, 
87 F.3d at 539. 
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arrangement for the resale of insurance policies pooled by the viatical 
settlement company are arguably offered in such a way as to support their 
characterization as investment contracts.104 To be clear, the focus of this 
analysis is not the issue of whether viatical settlements should be 
characterized as securities; commentators have weighed in on that a 
myriad of times in the past fifteen years.105 Nor is the focus herein on how 
to harmonize the differing characterizations of investments for similarly-
situated viators. Rather, the issue herein is whether the Howey test, with its 
inherent and intentional flexibility, continues to further the investor 
protection goals of the federal securities laws in light of the disparate 
outcomes for such viators, and if not, what approaches can be taken with 
respect to the Howey test to further the goal of investor protection.  
The viatical industry was largely unregulated in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Various interested parties have changed this, at least on the purchase 
side.106 The initial purchase of life insurance policies by viatical settlement 
firms from AIDS patients and other terminally ill viators was the first area 
of regulation in this industry, undertaken in an effort to protect this 
vulnerable population from being exploited by unscrupulous and 
unlicensed purchasers.107 The purchase side of the viatical settlement 
industry is now subject to fairly extensive regulation at the state level, 
typically by state insurance departments, in forty-five states. 108 On the 
                                                 
104 The Life Partners district court put it succinctly when it said “[a]t issue is an 
unusual investment that rests within the grey area of securities laws.” 898 F. Supp. at 17. 
Commentators, including this author, have argued that viatical settlements should be 
characterized as securities to provide protections for the vulnerable viators who, in the 
absence of the federal securities laws’ required disclosure and remedies, are left to their 
own information-gathering and with just common law fraud and any state law remedies.  
Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must Be 
Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345, 349 (1999). 
105 Shanah Glick, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the Regulatory Control 
of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L.R. 957, 975 (1993). Glick was the first to 
comment in a law journal on the regulation of viatical settlements, concluding that 
viatical settlements were categorically not securities. Id. Since then, over 100 
commentators have weighed in on the issue.  
106 These interested parties include viatical settlement companies and industry groups 
who strongly opposed regulating the purchase of policies, like the Viatical Association of 
America, the National Association of People with AIDS and AIDS lobbyists who pushed 
hard for regulation to protect the vulnerable viators, along with state insurance 
departments who banded together to draft model legislation. See infra note 109 and 
accompanying text. 
107 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
108 In 1993, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafted the 
“Viatical Settlements Model Act,” which was adopted by eleven jurisdictions. These laws 
typically cover the licensing of viatical settlement companies, disclosure obligations, 
confidentiality concerns, and best practices for viatical settlement firms. See infra app. A 
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resale side, the SEC has continued its efforts to have these interests 
characterized as securities under the federal securities laws, with some 
success.109 
 
III. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AS A VEHICLE TO EVALUATE HOWEY 
 
The purchase and pooling of any assets, like car loans, mortgages, or 
life insurance policies, and the resale of fractionalized interests therein, 
triggers the critical securities law issue of whether the sale constitutes a 
sale of investment contracts, and thus securities, under the Howey test.110 
The characterization of any interest as a security has important and far-
reaching ramifications for both the investor and seller thereof. Ideally, this 
characterization should be consistent and supportable under the relevant 
law. This has not been the case in the viatical settlement industry, raising 
concerns about the continued viability of the Howey test with respect to 
viatical settlements, which in turn raises concerns on a broader level with 
respect to the status of asset-backed securities in general. 
                                                                                                                         
(a list of the jurisdictions that have statutes and/or regulations covering the purchase of 
insurance policies from viators). 
109 The two federal appellate courts to rule on this issue are the D.C. Circuit and the 
Eleventh Circuit. See discussion infra Part III. The D.C. Circuit court offered its thoughts 
on why the viatical settlement industry had not been subject to more regulation at the 
time of the case: 
At the same time that it was issuing these three preliminary injunctions 
against LPI, the district court acknowledged that the company provides 
“valuable funds [to] AIDS patients in their final illness” and that after 
“an apparently exhaustive two-year investigation” the SEC could 
produce no evidence or even allegations “that any investor, terminally 
ill patient, or insurance company has been defrauded, misled, or is in 
any way dissatisfied with an LPI viatical settlement.” The Commission, 
however, points out that the securities laws, and in particular the 
disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, are intended to 
prevent abuses before they arise. Still, that neither policyholders nor 
investors have complained of any abuse may help to explain why the 
viatical settlements industry is not more regulated. A number of states 
have enacted laws protecting the insureds but, according to the SEC, no 
state has undertaken specifically to protect investors in viatical 
settlements. (In all states investors are still protected by the common 
law of fraud, of course.)  
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538-39. 
110 If the viatical settlement firm sells the policy as a whole, in what is known as a 
“brokered” viatical settlement, no securities law issue arises as there is no commonality 
of either sort. There is no horizontal commonality because there are no other investors 
with interest in the policy and no vertical commonality because there is no reliance on the 
promoter’s efforts to generate a profit. 
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The characterization of viatical settlements as securities has been 
considered by two federal courts of appeal: the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in Life Partners (LPI)111 and by the Eleventh Circuit 
in Mutual Benefits (MBC).112 Although both the LPI and MBC courts 
anchor their decisions onto their particular understanding and 
interpretation of the Howey test, both explicitly availing themselves of the 
flexibility that Congress created by leaving the term investment contract 
undefined,113 the two courts reached opposite conclusions.114 Because the 
cases are factually consistent, however, it is not possible to harmonize the 
two holdings. Investors are thus left with no clarity or certainty regarding 
the treatment of their interests under the federal securities laws, and 
viatical settlement companies can have no confidence that they can 
conduct their businesses as currently conducted, without potentially 
running afoul of the securities laws.115 
In LPI and MBC, the SEC charged a large viatical settlement firm116 
with violations of the federal securities laws, including the offering and 
sale of unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.117 
In each case, the respective district court agreed with the SEC, and issued 
opinions, leading to the imposition of an injunction against the viatical 
settlement firms, prohibiting the sale of these securities.118 However, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in LPI, finding 
the viatical settlements at issue not to be securities,119 while the Eleventh 
                                                 
111 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
112 SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). 
113 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549; Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742. 
114 Compare Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549 (finding viatical settlements are not 
securities under Howey), with Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 (finding viatical 
settlements to be securities consistent with Howey). 
115 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the similarity in facts when it referred to 
“Life Partners, a case involving facts similar to those presented here.” Mut. Benefits 
Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 (italics added). 
116 At the time of LPI, Life Partners was the largest viatical settlement firm in the 
nation. SEC v. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d 536 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Similarly, between 1994 and 2004 more than 29,000 investors 
nationwide invested more than $1 billion in viatical settlements offered by the Mutual 
Benefits Corp. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 738. 
117 The SEC charged Mutual Benefits Corp. with: sale of unregistered securities in 
violation of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, fraud in violation of section 
17(a)(l) of the Securities Act, fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5, thereunder. See Complaint at 18-19, SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 04-60573), 2004 WL 2876016. 
118 See Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); see also Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 
408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). 
119 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549. 
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Circuit affirmed the district court in MBC, finding that the viatical 
settlements were securities;120 both cases relied on the same law and 
applied that law to essentially the same facts. 
A side-by-side examination of each court’s analysis of the Howey test 
demonstrates the inconsistencies in the courts’ respective articulations, 
and, more importantly, the inconsistencies in their respective applications 
of the language of the Howey test. Although this examination supports the 
conclusion that the decision in MBC is sound as a matter of law and policy 
while the decision in LPI is not, or vise versa, the analysis of these cases is 
a means to an end. These conflicting decisions prompt an evaluation of the 
continued viability of the Howey test as the touchstone for determining the 
characterization of an interest as an investment contract, ultimately 
questioning whether the Howey test is furthering the goals of the federal 
securities laws. 
Both the LPI and MBC courts acknowledged Howey’s precedent as 
binding, but each court articulated the test slightly differently. The 
Eleventh Circuit articulated the Howey test as follows: (1) an investment 
of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) the expectation of profits 
derived solely from the efforts of others.121 The D.C. Circuit articulated 
the Howey test as follows: “an investment contract is a security subject to 
the [1933] Act if investors purchase [the interest] with (1) an expectation 
of profits arising from (2) a common enterprise that (3) depends upon the 
efforts of others.”122 These differing expressions of the Howey test are 
noteworthy only to support the conclusion that the courts take latitude in 
articulating the precedents under which they are bound; however, the 
differences in articulation themselves have no substantive effect in these 
viatical settlement cases. What has a substantive effect in these cases, 
however, is the differing interpretation of the same precedent by the two 
courts, which is problematic and results in two entirely opposite 
characterizations of the same interests under the same test. This raises 
concerns not only in the context of the viatical settlement industry, as the 
two decisions are binding precedents in their respective jurisdictions, but 
also for the issuers and purchasers of other forms of asset-backed 
securities who may face a judge inspired to apply the LPI holding to other 
forms of asset-backed investments. 
Investment of money. Both the LPI and MBC courts acknowledged, 
either tacitly or expressly, that the investors in the viatical settlements at 
issue met the investment of money requirement of Howey.123   
                                                 
120 Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 745. 
121 Id. at 742-43. 
122 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542. 
123 The MBC trial court tacitly acknowledged that the investment of money criteria is 
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Commonality. Both the LPI and MBC courts concluded that investors 
in the viatical settlements at issue met the appropriate version of 
commonality.124 The D.C. Circuit has adopted horizontal commonality as 
the standard for a common enterprise under Howey, noting that “it is the 
inter-dependency of the investors that transforms the transaction 
substantively into a pooled investment.”125 The court found the pooling of 
investment funds, shared profits, and shared losses present in the viatical 
settlements at issue, and as a result, found horizontal commonality.126 
                                                                                                                         
satisfied when it noted that the defendants were seeking to dismiss the action for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because “viatical settlements fail to meet the second and third 
elements of the test set forth in Howey.” Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
The Eleventh Circuit expressly acknowledged that the investment of money criteria is 
met when it says that there “is no genuine dispute here that there was (1) an investment of 
money.” Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742. The LPI trial court did not discuss the 
investment of money criteria, which is consistent with its articulation of the Howey test: 
“An investment contract is ‘a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests 
his money [1] in a common enterprise and [2] is led to expect profits [3] solely from the 
efforts of the promoter or a third party.’” Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 19 (quoting SEC 
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)). The court began its analysis with its 
first prong, focusing on whether a common enterprise is present, thereby tacitly 
acknowledging that the requisite investment of money has occurred. Id. at 19. 
124 Both trial courts concluded that their respective viatical settlements satisfy 
commonality. The LPI trial court found both forms of commonality: 
Horizontal commonality exists through LPI’s sale of fractional interests 
in the death benefit due under a single policy. The fortunes of each 
investor are tied to that of the other investors in that policy, with 
proceeds to be divided on a pro rata basis …. Both types of vertical 
commonality are also present in this case. The investors' fortunes are 
tied to those of the promoter since LPI takes title to the policies. From 
the perspective of both the insurance company and the insured, LPI is 
the new owner and beneficiary of the life insurance policies. Investors 
are dependent upon LPI to protect their interests, and their interests 
would be greatly affected by LPI's dissolution or insolvency. Such risks 
are sufficient to meet the test for vertical commonality. 
Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 20.  The MBC trial court only found vertical 
commonality. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
125 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 544. 
126 According to the court: 
It seems to us that the pooling issue reduces to the question whether 
there is a threshold percentage of a policy that must be sold before an 
investor can be assured that his purchase of a smaller percentage 
interest will be consummated. If not, then each investor's acquisition is 
independent of all the other investors’ acquisitions and LPI is correct in 
asserting that there is no pooling. On the other hand, if LPI must have 
investors ready to buy some minimum percentage of the policy before 
the transaction will occur, then the investment is contingent upon a 
pooling of capital. 
Id. 
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These characteristics were present because the viatical settlements 
involved multiple investors who aggregated their invested funds into the 
purchase of interests in one or more policies, so no one investor could 
purchase a single policy alone. Further, as a result of the structure, no 
investor in any policy could realize a gain or loss without the identical, 
albeit proportional, effect on the remaining investors in that same 
policy.127 
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted vertical commonality as its standard 
for a common enterprise under Howey, which requires only “the success 
of the investors to be dependent on the success of the investment 
promoters' efforts to secure a return.”128 Here, the investors' return was 
“highly dependent” on the promoters’ efforts, which included efforts by 
MBC to locate policies, negotiate the purchase price, and bid on policies. 
MBC recruited doctors to evaluate the health of potential viators and 
produce a life expectancy valuation on the viators, and created the legal 
documents necessary to conclude the transactions.129 MBC marketed its 
expertise in these areas to potential investors.130 As a result, the district 
court found that the viatical settlements in MBC satisfied the commonality 
requirement of Howey, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this 
conclusion.131 
Expectation of profit. Both the LPI and MBC courts concluded that the 
investors had the requisite expectation of profits from their investments. 
The LPI district court held that the investors’ returns under the viatical 
settlements “qualifie[d] as profit under Howey.”132 The D.C. Circuit court 
was not so quick to make that determination, looking into whether 
                                                 
127 Id. at 543. 
128 Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. 
129 Id. at 1338. 
130 Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 at 739. The court found: 
MBC touted to potential investors its expertise in evaluating life 
expectancy, and thus its ability to make the venture successful. Id. 
Robert Roberts, a former in-house sales director at MBC, testified that 
investors were told about MBC's expertise in selecting policies and the 
track record it claimed in predicting life expectancy…. Roberts was 
instructed to inform inquiring investors that MBC correctly estimated 
life expectancy 80% of the time.  
Id. 
131 Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 n.4. The Eleventh Circuit notes that Mutual 
Benefits Corp. made what it characterized as a “passing objection” to the district court’s 
conclusion that the investments in viatical settlements satisfied the common enterprise 
prong of Howey, but the court found that argument meritless, finding that these interests 
satisfy both horizontal and vertical commonality. Id. 
132 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 21 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d 
536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
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investors in the LPI viatical settlements had the requisite expectation of 
profit.133 The D.C. Circuit court ultimately found that investors received 
an asset in the form of a claim on future death benefits of the viator, which 
was not able to be “currently consumed” but instead was purchased for the 
prospect of return on the investment.134 Thus, the D.C. Circuit determined 
that the sale of fractionalized interests in these viatical settlements 
satisfied the “expectation of profit” requirement from Howey. The 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the investors in the MBC viatical 
settlements had an expectation of profit, noting there was “no genuine 
dispute” as to the satisfaction of this portion of the Howey test.135  
Solely from the efforts of others. As noted above, both the LPI and 
MBC courts concluded that the investors in the viatical settlements at issue 
invested money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits.136 
The two courts differed, however, in their interpretation of what the 
“expectation of profits” prong requires, and their application of their own 
differing interpretation to essentially the same investments. 
A necessary first step for both the LPI and MBC courts was to 
catalogue the efforts of the promoters, in order to then evaluate whether 
such efforts were “undeniably significant,” “essential,” and 
“managerial.”137 Both viatical settlement companies located the policies, 
negotiated the purchase price with the viators, drafted the relevant legal 
documentation necessary to complete the purchase of each policy, and 
retained doctors to evaluate the life expectancy of the viators.138 Both 
firms undertook to pay the post-closing premiums necessary to keep the 
policies in good standing, either from operating funds or from the 
investors’ funds, if the purchase agreement so provided.139 
After cataloging the efforts of the promoters, both courts measured 
them against the requirements of the Howey test. Both the D.C. Circuit 
and the Eleventh Circuit have adopted the more relaxed reading of “solely 
from the efforts of others,” looking for those efforts that are “undeniably 
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure 
or success of the enterprise.”140 How the two courts interpret this relaxed 
standard, however, is quite different. 
                                                 
133 Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 542-43. 
134 Id. at 543. 
135 Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742-43. 
136 See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text. 
137 SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 
408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 
1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
138 Id. at 1338; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539. 
139 Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 740; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540. 
140 Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1342, aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) 
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Both viatical settlement companies asked that the courts draw a 
distinction between the promoter’s activity before the resale of 
fractionalized interests to the investor and that same activity after such 
sale, for purposes of this prong of Howey. Their argument was that the 
promoter’s efforts before the resale of the policy to the investor somehow 
falls outside the scope of the Howey test, as if the Howey test required that 
the investor’s expectation of profits derived solely from efforts of the 
promoter after the investor had invested money in to the common 
enterprise.141 This concept is not present in the verbiage or interpretation 
of the original Howey test, and in fact is not present in any other judicial 
decision interpreting Howey other than the LPI opinion. 
The LPI court had an opportunity to further the goals of the federal 
securities laws, but instead chose to judicially validate the non-existent 
nuances in the Howey test proposed by Life Partners as a basis to find that 
the viatical settlements in question were not investment contracts, thereby 
denying the protection of the federal securities laws to the investors 
therein.142 Perhaps in an effort to rein in the flexibility of the Howey test, 
the D.C. Circuit created a bright-line test tied to the time of sale, so that 
the same undeniably significant and essential managerial efforts that occur 
before the investor buys the policy do not satisfy Howey. Yet if these same 
efforts occurred post-closing, they would somehow then satisfy Howey.143 
This artificial test is neither required by nor supportable under Howey. It is 
inconsistent with the goals of the federal securities laws, and is based on a 
misconception or misunderstanding about the nature of this form of asset-
backed security.144 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[b]right-line rules are 
discouraged in the context of federal securities laws for the reason that 
they tend to create loopholes that can be used by the clever and 
dishonest.”145 Indeed, the bright-line rule enunciated in LPI created a 
                                                                                                                         
(quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999)). The 
court’s standard in LPI is also relaxed from “soley” looking instead for “profits derived 
prominently from the efforts of others.” Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545. 
141 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545. 
142 Id. at 548. 
143 See id. at 551. 
144 It is worth noting that the SEC commented: 
[E]ven if the Court were to adopt the bright-line rule of Life Partners, 
MBC’s significant entrepreneurial and managerial post-purchase 
activities would still satisfy the third prong of Howey. Defendants 
dispute the contention. Because the Court declines to follow Life 
Partners, the Court need not reach the issue of timing. 
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408 
F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). Other courts have declined to follow LPI. See, e.g., 
Wuliger v. Christie, 310 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ohio 2004).  
145 Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. 
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loophole, which became the defendants' corporate structure model in 
MBC. Anthony Livoti, trustee for Mutual Benefits, testified in his 
deposition that the “attorneys of Mutual Benefits were cognizant of the 
SEC vs. Life Partners case.”146 Indeed, counsel for Mutual Benefits 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mutual Benefits attempted to 
restructure certain portions of their operations to conform to the D.C. 
Circuit's ruling in LPI.147 
The Eleventh Circuit declined to make the distinctions that the D.C. 
Circuit did, and refused to differentiate pre and post-sale efforts for 
purposes of characterizing the underlying instruments.148 The “key 
question” according to the court was “whether profits are derived from the 
activities of the promoter or rather, the operation of external market forces 
beyond the control of the promoter.”149 This distinction makes sense in 
light of the underlying goals of the securities law: disclosure will only 
offer protection in investments that depend on the promoters, and will 
have no effect on investments that depend on the operation of market 
forces external to those promoters.150 With that standard in place, the court 
was not persuaded by Mutual Benefits’s contention that the profits of the 
viatical settlements are determined by the purely external force of the 
actual date of death of the viator.151 While the date of death is certainly an 
important factor in the profitability of a viatical settlement, the underlying 
pricing is more critical; the viatical settlement company’s efforts, pre-
purchase, in locating and negotiating the terms of purchase (and inherent 
therein in calculating a probable life expectancy for the viator), will have a 
significant, if not dispositive effect on the profitability of the viatical 
settlement.152 The investors’ initial dependence on the viatical settlement 
company’s expertise also continues after the investment. The MBC court 
noted that neither offerees nor purchasers of the fractionalized interests 
had access to the insureds’ medical files, and so could not hire experts to 
engage in life expectancy evaluations.153 The investors had to rely on the 
                                                 
146 Id. (italics added). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1343 n.8. The SEC disputed the validity of the new bright-line test, but in an 
effort to cover all bases, advanced the position that even if the court were to somehow 
adopt the Life Partners test, MBC’s “significant entrepreneurial and managerial post-
purchase activities would still satisfy the third prong of Howey.” Id. Because the MBC 
court declined to follow Life Partners, it refused to evaluate the SEC’s argument. Id. 
149 Id. at 1342. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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viatical settlement company for this critical pre-purchase function154 to 
monitor and protect their investment. In the absence of required 
disclosures under the federal securities laws, this reliance may be to their 
detriment. 
In an odd wrinkle that came out during the MBC trial, it turns out that 
Mutual Benefits, among its other acts of fraud, typically had the life 
expectancy evaluations done after the closing.155 This highlights the 
reliance that investors have on Mutual Benefits’s efforts, as they have no 
access to the necessary medical information to undertake a life expectancy 
calculation on their own. Ironically, because of this fraud, more of Mutual 
Benefits’s efforts were actually made post-purchase, although one doubts 
if that is what the D.C. Circuit had in mind when crafting their bright-line 
test.156 
IV. LEGISLATING AROUND THE HOWEY TEST 
 
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on issues like 
horizontal versus vertical commonality, or on pre-purchase versus post-
purchase promoter efforts for satisfying Howey, investors are denied 
certainty about the characterization of new and innovative investments as 
securities, including viatical settlements. Arguably as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s silence on the lower courts’ interpretations of the Howey 
test, other avenues of investor protection have been opening up in the form 
of model laws, amended statutes, and judicial opinions. 
                                                 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 740 
156 According to the court: 
There is evidence in the record that MBC, in fact, routinely did not 
receive life-expectancy evaluations until after closing. Melanie 
Goldberg was the person at MBC responsible for preparing the post-
closing information to be sent to investors. She explained that she 
worked from a spreadsheet listing recently “closed” policies. This 
“closed” list provided the insureds' names, their life expectancies, and 
the closing dates. Goldberg routinely received medical records after a 
closing and sent them to one of the doctors used by MBC. Later, she 
got the medical reports back from the doctors and sent them to 
investors. When drafting reports for doctors to sign, Goldberg testified 
that she (in accordance with MBC policy) entered the date MBC 
acquired a particular policy as the date of the medical report. Doctors' 
reports were always pre-dated, she explained, because “it had to look 
like it was being reviewed at the time the viator was selling the 
policy ... that it had to show that it was reviewed at the time the file was 
sold, not afterwards.” 
Id. at 739 (internal citations omitted). 
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First, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws updated the Uniform Securities Act, included the following as part 
of its definition of security in section 102(28)(D) of the revised act: 
 
[A]n investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits 
to be derived primarily from the efforts of a person other than the 
investor and a “common enterprise” means an enterprise in which the 
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of either the person 
offering the investment, a third party, or other investors.157 
 
This first part of the definition is derived from the Howey test, and 
essentially codifies the most liberal version of the test; this definition 
adopts the looser approach to “solely from the efforts of others” and 
specifically authorizes both horizontal and vertical commonality, offering 
an inclusive reading of the test that will cover interests that would satisfy 
the definition of investment contract across all circuits. The definition 
excludes any mention of pre- or post-purchase efforts bright-line, and so 
arguably includes viatical settlements like those at issue in LPI within the 
definition of security. 
The Uniform Act language offers clarity on the characterization of all 
interests as investment contracts, allowing states that adopt this language 
to offer much more certainty to investors in their jurisdiction on the 
characterization of a particular investment interest, including viatical 
settlements. That said, the treatment of viatical settlements by the LPI 
court was a factor for the drafters of the Uniform Act in constructing this 
definition. As the prefatory notes to the 2002 version of the Uniform Act 
provide, the definition of security was modernized, among other goals, to 
“amplify the definition of investment contract so that it can expressly 
reach interests in … viatical settlement agreements, among other 
contracts, when they satisfy the definition of investment contract.”158 Thus 
the drafters included in their definition of security in section 102(28)(E) 
that the term investment contract includes an interest in “a viatical 
settlement or similar agreement.”159 
States have begun to legislate around the uncertainty stemming from 
the flexibility of Howey by essentially codifying a clear explication of the 
components of the Howey test, with some states using the language in the 
Uniform Securities Act. To date, seventeen states have included in their 
statutory definition of security, language that codifies some or all of the 
concepts of the Howey test, in essence, crafting state law tests for 
                                                 
157 UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(D) (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 29 (2006). 
158 UNIF. SEC. ACT General Notes (amended 2002). 
159 UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(E) (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 29 (2006). 
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identifying an investment contract.160 This approach may eliminate some 
of the uncertainty presently surrounding the application of the Howey test 
to innovative and unusual investment vehicles, dependent, of course, on 
how the states articulate and apply these tests. 
Some states have gone further in the context of viatical settlements 
through judicial decisions and legislation. These states can distance 
themselves from the bright-line test in LPI for purposes of evaluating the 
characterization of a particular interest under their own state law, and at 
the same time, further the underlying purposes of their securities laws, 
which are typically analogous to those underlying the federal securities 
laws. To date, ten state courts have ruled that viatical settlements are 
securities.161 These courts focused on the remedial goals of their state 
securities laws,162 and the persuasive, non-binding nature of federal court 
                                                 
160 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin include viatical settlements within their definition of security. 
See infra app. B. 
161 See Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); In People ex rel. 
Wood v. Innovative Fin. Services, No. D045555, 2006 WL 392030, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Feb. 17, 2006), the California courts were 
not persuaded by the analysis of the court in Life Partners, which in 
finding the viatical settlement contracts were not investment contracts, 
made a distinction between an investment promoter's activities prior to 
his having use of an investor's money and his activities after he has use 
of the money. Like other federal courts, “we are not convinced that 
[Howey] require[s] such a clean distinction.” 
Id. at *6 (quoting Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (citation omitted)); see also 
Joseph v. Viatica Mgmt., LLC, 55 P.3d 264 (Colo. App. 2002); Kligfeld v. 
Office of Fin. Regulation, 876 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2004); Allen v. Jones, 
604 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Accelerated Benefits Corp. v. Peaslee, 818 
N.E.2d 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Sec. Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher, 797 N.E.2d 
789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003); Hill v. Dedicated Res., Inc., No. 99-C-1714, 2000 WL 34001915 (Kan. 
Ct. App. July 12, 2000); Lubin v. Benefit Assurance, Ltd., No. 24-C-02-006515, 
2006 WL 5781983 (Md. Nov. 19, 2002); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Schwalm v. Penn. Sec. Comm’n, 965 A.2d 326 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2009); Stellar v. Penn. Sec. Comm’n, 877 A.2d 518 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2005). The only court, other than the D.C. Circuit, to hold viatical 
settlements do not constitute securities is Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 10-
01-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418 (Tex. App. May 26, 2004). 
162 For example, the Colorado court noted: 
Moreover, we conclude defendants [sic] position is inconsistent with 
the policies embraced by Colorado's own General Assembly. See § 11-
51-101(3), C.R.S. 2001 (provisions and rules under the Act shall be 
coordinated with federal acts and statutes to the extent consistent with 
the purposes of the Act) .… One purpose of the Act is to protect 
investors. The Act is remedial in nature and is to be broadly construed 
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decisions on state courts interpreting state laws, in holding that the viatical 
settlements at issue were, in fact, securities.163 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona, for example, considered the 
characterization of viatical settlements in Siporin v. Carrington,164 holding 
that the viatical settlement agreements at issue were securities for purposes 
of the Arizona Securities Act.165 In so holding, the court focused on 
remedial goals of the Arizona Securities Act.166 The court noted that the 
Arizona definition of security was virtually identical to that of the 1933 
and 1934 Acts, and further noted that in interpreting the otherwise 
undefined term investment contract, it would look to the federal courts for 
guidance.167 At the time of the decision, the only federal court to opine on 
the issue was the D.C. Circuit’s LPI decision. The Arizona court declined 
to follow the bright-line test therein, to avoid “taking a position 
inconsistent with the policies embraced by our own legislature,” one that 
would “not advance the Arizona policy of protecting the public from 
unscrupulous investment promoters” like the LPI decision.168 The court 
had harsh words for the bright-line test, finding no more than “tangential 
support”169 for it in Howey or any other federal decisions; the court found 
                                                                                                                         
to effectuate its purposes. See § 11-51-101(2), C.R.S. 2001; Sauer v. 
Hays, 36 Colo. App. 190, 539 P.2d 1343 (1975). In light of the 
prophylactic and remedial purposes of the Act, and our duty to interpret 
it broadly, we conclude that Life Partners is clearly distinguishable, 
and we are not persuaded by either the rationale or conclusions reached 
in that case. 
Viatica Mgmt., 55 P.3d at 267. 
163 According to the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of California, 
“[A]lthough the California Corporate Securities Law was patterned after the federal 
Securities Act of 1933, the federal cases interpreting the federal law offer persuasive 
rather than controlling authority in construing state law." People ex rel. Wood, 2006 WL 
392030, at *6 (citation omitted). 
164 23 P.3d 92. 
165 Id. at 98. 
166 Id. at 95 (quoting 1951 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 18, § 20). The court stated:  
The intent and purpose of this Act is for the protection of the public, the 
preservation of fair and equitable business practices, the suppression of 
fraudulent or deceptive practices in the sale or purchase of securities, 
and the prosecution of persons engaged in fraudulent or deceptive 
practices in the sale or purchase of securities. This Act shall not be 
given a narrow or restricted interpretation or construction, but shall be 
liberally construed as a remedial measure in order not to defeat the 
purpose thereof. 
Id. at 95. 
167 Id. at 96. 
168 Id. at 98. 
169 Id.  
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the bright-line test to be a “convenient but inflexible and formalistic 
approach to the application of the 1933 and 1934 federal Securities 
Acts”170 that does not serve “the prophylactic and remedial purposes of the 
Arizona Securities Act.”171 The Arizona legislature apparently agreed and 
amended the securities laws in 2000 to specifically include viatical 
settlements within the definition of security.172 
Like Arizona, thirty-three other states have amended their securities 
laws to include viatical settlements in their definition of security, offering 
the investors therein added protection under the state securities laws.173 
These statutes describe viatical settlements in different ways, consistent 
with the Uniform Act’s inclusion on its list of securities “viatical 
settlement or similar agreement.”174 The official comments to the Uniform 
Act state that 
 
[t]his Act also refers to an investment in a viatical settlement or a 
similar agreement to make unequivocally clear that viatical settlement 
[sic] and similar agreements, which otherwise satisfy the definition of 
an investment contract, are securities. This is intended to reject the 
holding of one court that a viatical contract could not be a security. 
 
These comments are followed by a citation to the D.C. Circuit 
Court opinion in LPI.175 
The amended statutes did not put an immediate end to the litigation 
about the status of viatical settlements as securities. In the states that have 
specifically included viatical settlements in the laundry list definition of 
“securities,” litigation has arisen over interests that were purchased or sold 
prior to the inclusion of viatical settlements in the statute.176 The 
                                                 
170 Id. at 99. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 See infra app. B (for a list of the states that include viatical or life settlements in 
their definition of security). 
174 See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(E) (amended 2002); 7C U.L.A. 28 (2006). 
175 UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102 cmts. (amended 2005); 7C U.L.A. 28 (2006) (quoting Joel 
Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 243, 250 (2003)).  
176 To date, fifteen states have amended their statutory definition of security to 
include viatical settlements. See infra App. B. Defendants in these states made creative 
arguments that the legislature’s amendment of the statute to specifically include viatical 
settlements within the definition of security somehow shows that viatical settlements did 
not previously come within the definition of the statute. The courts have not been 
persuaded by that argument, arguably because viatical settlements satisfy the Howey test 
and should be considered securities even in the absence of statutory authority. In Georgia, 
the court held that “before July 1, 2002, a viatical contract could qualify as a security 
under Georgia law. Accordingly, we reject the trial court's ruling that Jones was entitled 
to summary judgment because the Allens and Adams could not prove the predicate RICO 
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defendants in these cases argue that because the definition at the time of 
the transaction did not include viatical settlements, they had not violated 
the state securities laws by selling unregistered securities, as the viatical 
settlements were not then considered securities. All but one of the courts 
to consider these cases have held that, although the statutory definition 
was not in place at the time of the transaction, an application of the Howey 
test demonstrated that the interests in question were nonetheless securities 
under Howey, even before the change in statutory language.177 
                                                                                                                         
act of selling unregistered securities by an unregistered agent.” Allen v. Jones, 604 S.E.2d 
644, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). See also Accelerated Benefits Corp. v. Peaslee, 818 N.E.2d 
73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); 
Security Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher ex rel. Roy, 797 N.E.2d 789, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003), trans. denied, 812 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  
177 But see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (illustrating that 
interests specifically set out in the definition do not have to, and in most cases, will not, 
satisfy Howey). In People ex rel. Wood v. Innovative Fin. Services, No. D045555, 2006 
WL 392030, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006), the court noted that California had 
regarded viatical settlements as securities even prior to the amendment of the statute, and 
concluded that the amendment was intended only to clarify existing law. In Glick v. 
Sokol, 777 N.E.2d 315, the court declined to include viatical settlement investments 
purchased prior to the amendment of the statute to include viatical settlements as 
securities under Ohio law: 
Under current Ohio law, viatical settlements are securities subject to 
registration. By Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, enacted after the transaction at 
issue in this case, the Ohio legislature amended the Ohio Revised Code 
"to make life settlement interests subject to the Ohio Securities Law." 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Preamble. Accordingly, as of October 5, 2001, 
the statutory definition of "security" expressly includes "any life 
settlement interest." R.C. 1707.01(B). 
Id. at 317. The court applies the Ohio case law test for the existence of a security from 
State v. George, 50 Ohio App. 2d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), and finds that the viatical 
settlements did not satisfy the test. Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 319 (“We conclude that a viatical 
settlement promoter’s efforts to perform the services it promised does not constitute the 
risks of the enterprise under George.”). This is especially surprising in light of the Ohio 
Division of Securities’ pronouncement prior to the opinion. According to the Glick court, 
“the division issued a pronouncement in which it concluded that in virtually all instances 
viatical settlements are securities subject to the regulatory framework of the Ohio 
Securities Act.” Id. at 319. The court declined to follow the Ohio Division of Securities’ 
interpretation of what constituted a security: 
Although we afford due deference to interpretations by administrative 
agencies with substantive expertise, we decline to follow the Division's 
determination that Glick's viatical settlements were securities under the 
Ohio Securities Act prior to the effective date of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551. 
We disagree with the Division's conclusion that viatical settlements are 
securities under the George test .… Our conclusion that the viatical 
settlements at issue were not securities is further bolstered by the 
legislature's clear intent for prospective application of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 551. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551 specifically provides that the addition 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court provided a rationale to support the statutory and 
jurisprudential policy of flexibility in the context of determining the 
coverage of the federal securities laws, finding that “[s]uch an approach 
has the corresponding advantage, though, of permitting the SEC and the 
courts sufficient flexibility to ensure that those who market investments 
are not able to escape the coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new 
instruments that would not be covered by a more determinate 
definition.”178 Flexibility in law is a valuable goal and powerful tool; but 
when taken to extremes, it can give the courts too much room to 
maneuver, and has the potential to undermine the purpose of the law at 
issue. In the case of the definition of investment contract, the cost of the 
flexibility built into the Howey test is the protection of at least one group 
of investors who seek judicial relief in a court bound to follow the D.C. 
Circuit’s bright-line test in LPI. 
With the current flexible definition of investment contract, a court can 
flesh out the definition to fit its view of a particular instrument, and courts 
in other jurisdictions not bound by this determination can flesh out the 
definition of the same interest in a different way. The cost of maintaining 
this flexible definition of investment contract is the potential for a very 
real difference in the kinds of protections offered to investors depending 
on where they buy the interests in question. Query whether this level of 
flexibility is what the Supreme Court had in mind when rendering the 
Howey opinion. That house in the neighborhood with all the additions 
built on is in danger of falling down around itself if these additions 
increase in weight. 
                                                                                                                         
of "life settlement interests" to the list of express securities under R.C. 
1707.01(B) "shall take effect six months after the effective date of this 
act." Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Section 3. The legislature further provided 
that "[a]ny person that, on the effective date of this act, transacts 
business in this state as a viatical settlement provider, viatical 
settlement representative, or viatical settlement broker may continue to 
do so pending approval of the person's application for a license, if the 
person applies for the license during the six-month period immediately 
following the effective date of this act." Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Section 
4. The Division's determination that Glick's investments were securities 
under the George test flies in the face of the legislative intent for 
prospective addition of viatical settlements to the list of securities under 
R.C. 1707.01. 
Id. at 319-20. But a year later, the same court found the viatical settlements in question to 
be securities. Rumbaugh v. Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 800 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2003). 
178 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990). 
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That said, the benefits of the flexibility of the Howey test arguably 
outweigh the costs in terms of inconsistent results for similar investments, 
as states have begun offering additional protections to investors within 
their borders through legislation and judicial rulings on the status of 
viatical settlements. And the Supreme Court does not seem interested in 
revisiting Howey, despite the “clear and significant” split in the courts on 
the issue of commonality179 and the LPI bright-line test. 
Certainly one rogue court crafting a bright-line test in LPI does not 
constitute a clear and significant split, but LPI is still good law in the D.C. 
Circuit, and is binding precedent for the characterization of viatical 
settlements in that jurisdiction.180 Potentially more problematic, LPI and 
its bright-line test are available for all the courts in that circuit to apply to 
any other interests that the courts believe are factually similar to the LPI 
facts. With the increasing numbers and types of innovative investment 
vehicles, including new forms of asset-backed and receivable financing, 
this is a real concern that should continue to be handled at the state level 
through appropriate legislation and judicial guidance. 
When and if the Supreme Court revisits Howey, it should comment on 
the component parts of the test, specifically adopting horizontal or vertical 
commonality, or, like the Uniform Act, both. At a minimum, the Court 
should also overrule the pre versus post purchase bright-line test from the 
D.C. Circuit. This would provide clarity for all the participants, both 
sellers and investors, in the “countless and variable schemes devised by 
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of 
profits.”181 This would have the added benefit of bringing increased 
investor protection in the viatical settlement industry to supplement 
protections offered at the state level. This could be accomplished without 
the Court even classifying fractional interests in viatical settlements as 
securities for purposes of the securities laws. Just these modifications to 
Howey would bring the resale of the fractionalized interests under the 
protection of the securities laws, complete with antifraud and disclosure 
obligations, and civil remedies. This would lend consistency to the viatical 
settlement markets, but more importantly, to the world of innovative and 
creative investment interests as a whole. 
In the absence of such clarity from the Supreme Court, states will continue 
to try to bridge the uncertainty, and through legislation and court decisions, get 
clarity for their investors. We can only hope that they craft their decisions with 
more precision and consistency than the D.C. Circuit did in LPI. 
                                                 
179 Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1985), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 
(1985) . 
180 See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
181 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
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APPENDIX A: VIATICAL REGULATIONS 
 
The following jurisdictions have statutes and/or regulations covering 
the purchase of insurance policies from viators: 
 
Alaska: 
• Statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.10 (2010) (viatical 
settlement transactions); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.155 (2010) 
(viatical settlement interests). 
• Regulations: ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 31.300-449 
(2010). 
Arizona: 
• Statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1850 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(viatical or life settlement investment contracts). 
• No regulations. 
Arkansas: 
• Statutes: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-81-801 to -818 (2010) 
(Life Settlements Act). 
• Regulations: 54-00 ARK. CODE R. § 69 (Lexis Nexis 2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
California: 
• Statutes: CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West 2005) 
(life and disability insurance, viatical settlement); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10209.3 (West 2005) (group life policies, assignment of 
incidents of ownership, viatical settlements); CAL. CORP. CODE § 
25508.5 (West 2006) (rescission or cancellation of viatical or life 
settlement contracts). 
• Regulations: CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2548.1-2548.31 
(2010) (viatical settlements). 
Colorado: 
• Statutes: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-7-601 to -620 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-2 (2009) (viatical 
settlements). 
Connecticut: 
• Statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-465 to -465q (2010) 
(life settlements). 
• Regulations: CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 38a-465-1 to -10 
(2000) (viatical settlements). 
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Delaware: 
• Statutes: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7501-7510 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• No regulations. 
Florida: 
• Statutes: FLA. STAT. §§ 626.991 to 626.99295 (LexisNexis 
2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 69O-204.010 to 
.201 (2009) (viatical settlements). 
Georgia: 
• Statutes: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-59-1 to -18 (2010) (life 
settlements). 
• Regulations: GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-93-.01 to -.10 
(2010) (life settlements). 
Hawaii: 
•  Statutes: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431E-1 to -53 
(repealed 2010) (life settlements). 
• No regulations. 
Idaho: 
• Statutes: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-1950 to -1965 (2010) 
(life settlements). 
• No regulations.  
Illinois: 
• Statutes: 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 159/1 to 159/999 
(West 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 5701.10 to .100 
(2010) (viatical settlements). 
Indiana: 
• Statutes: IND. CODE §§ 27-8-19.8-1 to -26 (LexisNexis 
2010) (living benefits arrangement). 
• Regulations: 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-61-1 to -12 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Iowa: 
• Statutes: IOWA CODE §§ 508E.1 to .20 (West 2009) 
(viatical settlement contracts). 
• Regulations: IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-48.1 to .14 (2009) 
(viatical and life settlements). 
Kansas: 
• Statutes: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-5001 to -5016 (2009) 
(viatical settlements). 
• No regulations 
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Kentucky: 
• Statutes: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.15-700 to -725 
(Lexis Nexis 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 9:310 to :320 (2010) 
(Viatical Settlement Broker License and Notification; Viatical 
Settlement Provider License); 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 15:050 
(2010) (reporting and general requirements for Viatical Settlement 
Providers and Brokers). 
Louisiana: 
• Statutes: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1791 to :1805 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, §§ 3901-19 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Maine: 
• Statutes: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 6801-6819 
(2010) (viatical and life settlements); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, 
§ 16511 (2010) (right to rescission applicable to sales of viatical or 
life settlement contracts). 
• Regulations: 02-031-931 ME. CODE R. § 1-12 (Weil 2010) 
(viatical and life settlements); 02-032-539 ME. CODE R. § 1-6 
(Weil 2010) (offers and sales of viatical or life settlement 
contracts). 
Maryland: 
• Statutes: MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 8-601 to -611 
(LexisNexis 2010), (Viatical Settlement Providers and Viatical 
Settlement Brokers); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-403 (LexisNexis 
2010) (fraudulent insurance acts, failure to return premiums, false 
or misleading claims); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-802 (LexisNexis 
2010) (reporting suspected insurance fraud); MD. CODE ANN., INS. 
§ 27-804 (LexisNexis 2010) (antifraud plans for viatical settlement 
providers). 
• Regulations: MD. CODE REGS. 31.09.11.00 to .02 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Massachusetts: 
• Statutes: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 212-23 
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.01 to .08 (2010) 
(viatical settlements and viatical loans). 
Michigan: 
• Statutes: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 550.521-.528 (West 
2010) (viatical settlement contracts). 
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• No regulations. 
Minnesota: 
• Statutes: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.961-.974 (West 2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• No regulations. 
Mississippi: 
• Statutes: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-7-201 to -223 (West 2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 28-000-074 MISS. CODE R. § 2000-1 (Weil 
2010) (viatical settlements regulation). 
Montana: 
• Statutes: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20-1301 to -1317 (2010) 
(Viatical Settlement Act). 
• Regulations: MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.6.8501 to -8512 (2010) 
(Viatical Settlement Agreement). 
Nebraska: 
• Statutes: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1101 to -1117 
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 210 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 76-001 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Nevada: 
• Statutes: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 688C.010 to -.510 
(West 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 688C.010 to -.240 
(2010) (viatical settlements). 
New Jersey: 
• Statutes: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30B-1 to -17 (West 2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-35.1 to -.18 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
New Mexico: 
• Statutes: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58A-20A-1 to -20A-11 
(West 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: N.M. CODE R. §13.9.15.1 to -.15.17 (Weil 
2010) (viatical settlements). 
New York: 
• Statutes: N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7801-7810 (McKinney 2010) 
(life settlements). 
• Regulations: N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §§ 
380.1-.10 (2010) (viatical settlements). 
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North Carolina: 
• Statutes: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-200 to -310 (West 
2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 12.1710 to -.1720 
(2010) (viatical settlements). 
North Dakota: 
• Statutes: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-33.4-01 to -33.4-16 
(2010) (life settlements). 
• Regulations: N.D. ADMIN. CODE 45-04-13-01 to -13-03 
(2010) (viatical settlement advertising). 
Ohio: 
• Statutes: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3916.01 to -.99 (West 
2010) (viatical settlements regulation). 
• Regulations: OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901-1-63 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Oklahoma: 
• Statutes: OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 4055.1 to -.17 (West 
2010) (Viatical Settlements Act of 2008). 
• Regulations: OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365:25-11-1 to -11-6 
(2010) (viatical settlements). 
Oregon: 
• Statutes: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 744.319 to -.358 (West 
2008) (life settlement contracts). 
• Regulations: OR. ADMIN. R. 836-014-0200 to -014-0400 
(2010) (life settlements). 
Pennsylvania: 
• Statutes: 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.1 to -.17 (West 
2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 31 PA. CODE §§ 90f.1-g.16 (2010) (individual 
imminent death/lifetime health care facility confinement benefits 
provided as accelerated death benefit or settlement of death 
benefit; provided by riders or built into policies–statement of 
policy). 
South Dakota: 
• No statutes. 
• Regulations: S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:08:07:31 (2010) (viatical 
settlements). 
Tennessee: 
• Statutes: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-50-101 (2010) (Viatical 
Settlements Act of 2009). 
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• Regulations: TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0780-1-71-.01 to 
-.11 (2010) (life settlements). 
Texas: 
• Statutes: TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1101.001 to .006 
(Vernon 2010) (life and viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.1701 to .1717 
(2010) (viatical and life settlements); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 
21.101 to .122 (2010) (insurance advertising, certain trade 
practices, and solicitation). 
Utah: 
• Statutes: UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23a-117 (West 2010) 
(special requirements for life settlement providers and producers); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-36-101 to -119 (West 2010) (Life 
Settlements Act). 
• Regulations: UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-222-1 to -222-17 
(2010) (viatical settlements); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-226-1 to 
-226-18 (2010) (submission of life insurance filings). 
Vermont: 
• No statutes. 
• Regulations: 21-020-047 VT. CODE R. § 1 (2010) (viatical 
settlements). 
Virginia: 
• Statutes: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1865.1 to .5 (2010) 
(licensing of viatical settlement brokers); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-
6000 to -6016 (2007) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: 14 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-71-10 to -100 
(2010) (viatical settlement providers and viatical settlement 
brokers). 
Washington: 
• No statutes.  
• Regulations: WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-97-010 to -050 
(2010) (viatical settlements); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460-10A-215 
(2010) (viatical and life settlement agreements). 
West Virginia: 
• Statutes: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-1 to -18 
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements). 
• Regulations: W. VA. CODE R. § 114-80-1 to -12 (2010) 
(viatical settlements). 
Wisconsin: 
• Statutes: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.68 (West 2010) (viatical 
settlements). 
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• No regulations.  
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APPENDIX B: STATES DEFINING VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AS SECURITIES 
 
The following states include viatical or life settlements in their 
definition of security:  
 
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(32), (37) (2010) (“viatical 
settlement interest,” which is further defined as “the entire interest or any 
fractional interest in a life insurance policy or in the death benefit under a 
life insurance policy that is the subject of a viatical settlement 
contract …”). 
 
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1801(26), (29) (2010) (“viatical or 
life settlement investment contract” which is further defined as “an 
agreement for consideration for the purchase, assignment, transfer, sale, 
devise or bequest of any portion of the death benefit under or ownership of 
either an insurance policy or certificate of insurance”). 
 
Arkansas: ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-42-102 (2010) (“viatical settlement 
contract or fractionalized or pooled interest therein”). 
 
California: CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 2009) (“viatical 
settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest therein; life 
settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest therein”). 
 
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51-201(17), (20) (2010) (“viatical 
settlement investment” which is further defined as "the contractual right to 
receive any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance 
policy or certificate, in exchange for consideration that is less than the 
expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”). 
 
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.021(21), (23) (LexisNexis 2010) 
(“viatical settlement investment,” which is further defined as “an 
agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest 
of all or any portion of a legal or equitable interest in a viaticated policy as 
defined in chapter 626”). 
  
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2 (2010) (“The term ... [i]ncludes as 
an investment contract, among other contracts, an interest in a limited 
partnership or a limited liability company and an investment in a viatical 
settlement or similar agreement.”). 
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Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 485A-102 (2010) (“The 
term … [i]ncludes as an ’investment contract’, among other contracts, an 
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an 
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement.”). 
 
Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-14-102 (2010) (“‘Security’ 
 … [i]ncludes as an ’investment contract,’ among other contracts, an 
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an 
investment in a viatical settlement, life settlement or senior settlement or 
similar agreement.”). 
 
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010) (“The 
term … includes as an ‘investment contract’, among other contracts, an 
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an 
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement.”). 
 
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 502.102(28)(f) (2010) (“viatical settlement 
investment contract,” which is further defined in § 502.102 (31A) as “a 
contract entered into by a viatical settlement purchaser, to which the viator 
is not a party, to purchase a life insurance policy or an interest in the death 
benefits of a life insurance policy, which contract is entered into for the 
purpose of deriving economic benefit”). 
 
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a102(28)(E) (2009) (“‘investment 
contract’ may include an interest in a limited partnership and a limited 
liability company and shall include a viatical investment as defined by rule 
adopted or order issued under this act”). 
 
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.310 (18), (20) (LexisNexis 
2010) (“life settlement investment,” which is further defined as “the 
contractual right to receive any portion of the death benefit or ownership 
of a life insurance policy or certificate, for consideration that is less than 
the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”). 
 
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16102 (28), ( 32) (2009) 
(“investment in a viatical or life settlement contract,” which is further 
defined as a “written agreement establishing the terms under which 
compensation or anything of value will be paid, which compensation or 
value is less than the expected death benefit of the insurance policy or 
certificate, in return for the assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of 
the death benefit or ownership of any portion of an insurance policy or 
certificate of insurance”). 
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Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 451.2102 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(“‘Security’ means … an investment in a viatical or life settlement 
agreement ….”). 
 
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 80A.41 (2009) (“The term … includes as 
an ‘investment contract,’ among other contracts, an interest in a limited 
partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in a viatical 
settlement or similar agreement”).  
 
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-105(n), (p) (repealed 2010) 
(“viatical settlement investment contract or a fractionalized or pooled 
interest therein,” which is further defined as “any agreement, regardless of 
title or caption, for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise or 
bequest of any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance 
policy or certificate for consideration that is less than the expected death 
benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”). 
 
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 409.1-102(28)(E) (2009) (“May include 
as an ‘investment contract’, [sic] among other contracts, an interest in a 
limited partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in a 
viatical settlement or similar agreement”). 
 
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-103(22)(a) (2009) (“viatical 
settlement purchase agreement”). 
 
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(15), (17) (2007) (“viatical 
settlement contract or any fractional or pooled interest in such contract,” 
which is further defined as “an agreement for the purchase, sale, 
assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest of all or any portion of the death 
benefit or ownership of a life insurance policy or contract for 
consideration [sic] which is less than the expected death benefit of the life 
insurance policy or contract”). 
 
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.295 (2009) (“viatical settlement 
investment”). 
 
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m), (w) (2010) (“a viatical 
investment,” which is further defined as “the contractual right to receive 
any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance policy or 
certificate, for consideration that is less than the expected death benefit of 
the life insurance policy or certificate”). 
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New Mexico: N.M. STAT. § 58-13C-102(DD)(7) (2010) (“includes as 
an investment contract an investment in a viatical settlement or similar 
agreement”).  
 
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-2(11), (13) (2009) (“viatical 
settlement contract or any fractional or pooled interest in a viatical 
settlement contract,” and viatical settlement contract is further defined as 
“an agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or 
bequest of all or any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life 
insurance policy or contract for consideration which [sic] is less than the 
expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or contract”). 
 
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(19), (21) (2009) 
(“viatical or life settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest 
therein,” which is further defined as “an agreement for the purchase, sale, 
assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest of any portion of the death benefit 
or ownership of a life insurance policy or certificate, for consideration that 
is less than the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or 
certificate”). 
 
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (West 2009) (“any life 
settlement interest,” which is further defined in § 1707.01(HH): “‘Life 
settlement interest’ means the entire interest or any fractional interest in an 
insurance policy or certificate of insurance, or in an insurance benefit 
under such a policy or certificate, that is the subject of a life settlement 
contract. For purposes of this division, ‘life settlement contract’ means an 
agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest 
of any portion of the death benefit or ownership of any life insurance 
policy or contract, in return for consideration or any other thing of value 
that is less than the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or 
contract. ‘Life settlement contract’ includes a viatical settlement 
contract ….”). 
 
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-102(32)(e) (2010) (“includes as 
an ‘investment contract,’ among other contracts, an interest in a limited 
partnership and a third party managed limited liability company and an 
investment in a viatical or life settlement or similar contract or 
agreement”). 
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South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(E) (2009) 
(“‘Investment contract’ may include, among other contracts, an interest in 
a limited partnership and a limited liability company and shall include an 
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement”). 
 
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31B-102(28)(E) (2010) 
(“includes as an investment contract, among other contracts, an interest in 
a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in 
a viatical settlement or similar agreement”). 
 
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-102(16) (West 2010) (“a life 
settlement contract, as defined in former § 56-50-102, or any fractional or 
pooled interest in a life insurance policy or life settlement contract”). 
 
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-13(ee)(i)(R) (2010) (“life settlement 
interest,” which is defined in § 61-1-13(v)(i) as “the entire interest or a 
fractional interest in any of the following that is the subject of a life 
settlement: (A) a policy; or (B) the death benefit under a policy”). 
 
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5102(28)(E) (2009) (“includes as 
an ‘investment contract’ among other contracts an interest in a limited 
partnership, a limited liability company, an investment in a viatical 
settlement, or similar agreement”). 
 
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(n) (2009) (“viatical 
settlement contract”).  
 
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 551.102(28) (2010) (“viatical settlement 
investment or similar agreement,” which is further defined by 
§ 551.102(32) as “the entire interest or any fractional or pool interest in a 
life insurance policy or certificate of insurance or in the death benefit 
thereunder that is the subject of a viatical settlement”). 
 
 
